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ABSTRACT
In 2004, the Trojan horse defense was at a crossroads, having been successfully employed in two
child pornography cases in the United Kingdom, resulting in acquittals. Despite the early
successes, the Trojan horse defense has failed to become a regularly employed strategy. The
original Trojan horse defense has now become part of the more general technical SODDI (Some
Other Dude Did It) defense, which includes the possibility of unknown actors using unsecured
Wi-Fi connections or having physical access to a computer to perform criminal acts. In the past
ten years, it has not been effective in the United States for criminal cases, with no published
acquittals in cases where it was the primary defense. Where the technical SODDI defense has
been successfully used as leverage in plea negotiations, there has been either poor forensics
performed by the prosecution or political pressure to resolve a matter. On the civil side, however,
the defense has been wildly successful, effectively shutting down large John Doe copyright
infringement litigation against non-commercial violators.
Keywords: SODDI defense, Trojan horse, copyright infringement

1. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, Brenner et al visited the use of the
Trojan horse defense in court, citing two
recent cases in the United Kingdom where
reasonable
doubt
was
successfully
established. In their seminal review, they
speculated that:
It may well be, as was suggested
earlier, that the success the defense
has so far enjoyed will be a transient
phenomenon, a product of the
general public’s current unfamiliarity
with computer technology and online
(Brenner, Carrier, & Henninger,
2004).
In the decade that followed, the defense
has evolved and, consistent with the
prediction above, has failed to become a
successful, mainstream strategy in criminal
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matters. Despite increases in computer
literacy for judges and juries and an
increased prosecutorial and investigative
awareness of the defense, it is still
occasionally employed, although it has not
become a commonplace strategy.
The Trojan horse defense and the more
general technology-driven SODDI (Some
Other Dude Did It) defense are raised most
frequently in child pornography cases,
though variants have been successfully
employed in civil litigation related to
copyright infringement. On the criminal
side, the defense has been largely
unsuccessful, though on the civil side,
specifically
in
cases
of
copyright
infringement, it has been employed more
fruitfully.
This paper examines the current state of
the Trojan horse defense, and the related,
Page 49

JDFSL V9N4

Technical SODDI Defenses: The Trojan Horse Defense Revisited

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
more frequent employed, technical SODDI
defense, which can include blaming an
unknown actor for using anything from a
single computer with multiple accounts to
an open wireless access point. It examines
United States case law for the past ten
years, and provides an analysis of the
current and future state of the technical
SODDI defense.

2. TYPOLOGY OF
TECHNICAL SODDI
DEFENSES
Trojan horses are a form of malware named
after the legendary Greek ploy to enter the
city of Troy. The term refers to a particular
type of malware that masquerades as
innocent software but contains malicious
code inside that entices a victim to install it
on
their
system
(Landwehr,
Bull,
McDermott, & Choi, 1994). For the
purposes of the Trojan horse defense, the
malware involved does not necessarily meet
the strict definition of a Trojan horse, but
may be a virus, worm, spyware, or even
legitimate software that facilitates an
unauthorized remote or local access.
At its heart, the Trojan horse defense is
simply a variant of the age-old SODDI
strategy. The strategy is to blame the
digital activities under investigation on
another actor, either known or unknown
(Lubet, 1992). The Trojan horse defense is
the most common form of the technical
SODDI defense, but other forms of the
defense exist. The actor in question in the
technical SODDI defense may be a person,
malware, or a combination of both.
In general, the technical SODDI defense
can be broken into a taxonomy based on the
type activity that is being put forth as
evidence. While the base defense is the
same, the strategy relies on different actors
and motivations (if motive can be indirectly
ascribed to malware) based on the type of
offense. Case law can be broken up into two
separate areas of offense–traditional Trojan
horse defenses, which blame the actions on
Page 50

software, and the more general technical
SODDI defenses, which blame the actions
on an unknown actor that may be either a
person or malware.

3. TRADITIONAL
TROJAN HORSE
CASES
Traditional Trojan horse cases generally rely
on forensic evidence to cast doubt that the
actions ascribed to a defendant’s machine
were performed by the defendant. They
sidestep the issue of “putting the defendant
at the keyboard” by blaming malicious code
running on the machine for the observed
actions.
The
two
common
defense
approaches are to forensically identify
malware currently on the machine (or
previously present on the machine), or to
find that sufficient malware protection was
not in place at the time of the events of
interest.
Traditional Trojan horse cases can be
broken up into two categories–contentrelated cases, where the malware is blamed
for the presence of contraband on a system,
and illegal access/system interference cases
where the malware is blamed for some
activity associated with a system. In cases
where both claims are made, the claim
associated with the primary activity being
charged is used to classify the case.

3.1 Content-Related Cases
Content-related cases are those where the
presence of material on an individual’s
digital media form the basis of the
criminality. The primary crime involved in
these cases is child pornography possession.
The general standard for possession of
contraband was set by United States v.
Kuchinski (US v. Kuchinski, 2006), a child
pornography possession case. In the case,
Kuchinski was found to have approximately
19,000 images of child pornography in his
Temporary Internet Files directory, both
active and deleted, and was charged with
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possession and receipt of child pornography.
On appeal, the court held that Kuchinski
could not be charged with possession of the
temporary files, finding:
Where a defendant lacks knowledge
about
the
cache
files,
and
concomitantly lacks access to and
control over those files, it is not
proper to charge him with possession
and control of the child pornography
images located in those files, without
some other indication of dominion
and control over the images.
Post-Kuchinski,
possession
of
contraband requires that the prosecution
show the defendant had knowledge about
the existence of content on a device and
access to a mechanism to affect that
content. This case would at first appearance
tend to support a technical SODDI defense,
requiring the prosecution to show that the
defendant had knowledge of the presence of
child pornography on a computer. The
courts have narrowly applied Kuchinski in
relation to technical SODDI defenses,
however.
In Wise v. State of Texas (Wise v.
State, 2012), Wise was convicted of the
possession of child pornography based on
deleted images found in free space on his
computer. The conviction was overturned
on appeal, based on Wise’s double defense
that (1) there were viruses found on his
computer, and the viruses could have
downloaded the child pornography, and (2)
the computer was purchased at a flea
market and the previous owner could have
downloaded the child pornography. The
appellate court’s decision was similarly
overturned and the trial court’s decision
held. The court found neither count
credible, opining that “placement of a
pornographic image on the free space of a
computer would be inconsistent with the
purpose for placing a virus on a computer”,
and that the testimony about previous
owner came from the defendant’s brother
and lacked specificity, leading to a
© 2014 ADFSL

reasonable possibility of bias. The court
further held that finding an extensive
collection of child erotica and browser
activity related to child pornography were
sufficient grounds to overcome the Trojan
horse defense and to uphold the original
conviction.
In several content-related cases, the
technical SODDI defense has been made
before proceeding to trial. In at least one
case, a defense forensics team conducted an
analysis and made use of the press prior to
trial, potentially facilitating a plea
agreement. In State of Arizona v. Bandy
(State of Arizona v. Matthew Bandy, 2005),
the defendant, the then 16-year-old
Matthew Bandy, was charged with
uploading child pornography to a Yahoo!
group and with possessing the child
pornography that was found on both his
computer and on a CD in his home. The
defense hired Tami Loehrs to perform a
forensic analysis. Loehrs identified what she
believed to be Trojan horse software on
Bandy's computer, and concluded that it "is
common for a person that views child
pornography to store the images on an
innocent person’s computer". A subsequent
forensic analysis found that, while there was
malware present, it was installed after the
dates of the child pornography offense and
did not contain the functionality to
surreptitiously download child pornography.
The examination further identified web
searches consistent with child pornography
activity and registration information linking
Bandy and the online Yahoo! account.
Bandy ultimately pleaded guilty to three
counts of distributing pornography to a
minor. The prosecutor's office ultimately
concluded:
In light of the circumstances
surrounding this case–such as the
age of the juvenile and his lack of
prior criminal conduct–we felt 90
years was disproportionately harsh
and offered a plea bargain allowing
Bandy to plead guilty to the lesser
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charge of distributing pornography
to minors. Bandy accepted this
agreement (Alexander, 2007).
In United States v. Kerr (US v. Kerr,
2006), Kerr was identified by the FBI when
he offered child pornography through
Internet Relay Chat (IRC). Kerr provided
the address of a server he hosted in the chat
room, offering to allow anyone who first
uploaded a contraband image to download
child pornography. An FBI special agent
was able to download an image depicting
sexual activity between pre-teen minors, and
an analysis of Kerr’s computer found child
pornographic images present. In a twist on
the Trojan horse defense, Kerr claimed that
he was actually writing a virus, for which he
would use the child pornography as a
distribution vector. The planned virus
would allegedly infect and damage the
machines of pedophiles. The forensic
analysis of Kerr’s machine found, however,
no evidence that he was writing any such
virus and Kerr’s conviction was upheld.
Although there have yet to be any
malware defenses brought forth in court
that have identified specific malware
associated with child pornography, at least
one virus made claims of finding child
pornography already present on a computer.
The Reveton ransomware virus would infect
a machine and claim to be from the FBI,
“identify” child pornography on the machine,
and then request the user pay a fine online.
While the virus did not place any actual
child pornography on machines, one user,
Jay Riley, went to his local police
department asking if he was wanted on
child pornography charges after being
infected with the virus. After Riley allowed
police to view his machine, they found child
pornography on it and he was arrested
(Matyszczyk, 2013).

3.2 Illegal Access/System
Interference Cases
In illegal access/system interference cases,
the Trojan horse claim is that malware was
Page 52

installed on the computer of a defendant or
used to take over the account of a
defendant. That computer or account was
then used as a launch pad to conduct illegal
activities. The activities may have been the
direct result of the malware, with the
malicious code automatically retrieving
content, or indirectly the result of the
malware, with the malicious code facilitating
remote access for a human attacker.
In United States v. Miller (US v. Miller,
2008), Miller was found to be in possession
of a Zip disk containing approximately 1,200
images of pornography, of which 20 were
child pornography. Miller claimed to have
no knowledge of the images, and presented a
two-part Trojan horse defense. In the first
part, Miller claimed that he previously had
a virus on his machine that may have
downloaded the images on his behalf (a
stored content claim). In the second portion
of the claim, Miller stated that he had been
the victim of credit card fraud and that the
accesses to websites may have been because
“someone may have gotten access to his ‘log
ons’ and credit card numbers”. The court
rejected both arguments. The digital
forensics report showed multiple accesses to
the Zip disk to copy child pornography.
Additionally, the defendant admitted to
acquiring the adult pornography on the
disk, which the forensics showed was copied
concurrent with the child pornography.
In United States v. Gardner (US v.
Gardner, 2012), Gardner was charged with
both possession and distribution of child
pornography. Part of the defense strategy
was to claim that either the defendant’s
brother was responsible (he had access to
the computer and the defendant had
bookmarked his online account to allow
automatic logins) or a virus found on the
computer was responsible. The court
reviewed the report of the computer
forensics expert presented by the defense,
and denied the inclusion of the portions
related to a possible Trojan horse defense,
stating:
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Absent any evidence (other than the
speculation
offered
by
the
Defendant) that a third party
hacked into the Gardner family
computer to download the offending
images,
[the
defense
expert’s]
conclusion is, at best, not relevant,
and would confuse the jury.
One of the most reported illegal
access/system interference cases employing
a technical SODDI defense never made it to
trial. Michael Fiola, a then-employee of the
Massachusetts Department of Industrial
Accidents, was charged with possession of
child pornography on his State-issued laptop
in August 2007. The charges were based, in
part, on an examination of the laptop by
State IT staff following unusually high
Internet activity associated with the
machine. The examination purported to find
child pornography and web activity
associated with child pornography. The
charges were dropped in 2008, but Fiola was
still terminated (Sweet, 2008).
The only publicly available examination
of Fiola’s computer was performed on behalf
of the defense, and while it concludes there
was malware present on the system, the
malware cited is not known to be associated
with child pornography. Statements in the
report such as "Since BBS’s have not been
active in almost 20 years, the use of this
term as a current search term makes no
sense and seems suspicious" regarding the
term "sun Lolita bbs" exhibit a poor
understanding of the terms used by child
pornographers (Steel, 2009), and far
reaching conclusions such as "I can say with
100% certainty that the Laptop was
compromised by numerous viruses and
Trojans and may have been hacked by
outside sources" are beyond those that can
be drawn from the information available in
the forensic report (Loehrs, 2009). On the
other hand, the IT examination done by the
State
is
not
available,
and
the
administrative
investigation
was
not
performed by forensic specialists, so no
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definitive conclusions can be drawn
regarding the state of compromise in the
case.
In State of Connecticut v. Amero (State
of Connecticut v. Amero, 2007), a substitute
teacher, Julie Amero, was initially convicted
on four counts of endangering the welfare of
a child for allowing her seventh grade class
to see pop-up ads containing adult
pornography. The prosecution claimed that
Amero visited pornographic websites on the
classroom computer that was visible to her
students. During the initial trial, the defense
was prevented from putting forth a theory
that malware caused the pop-ups (Green,
2008).
A review of the court transcripts and a
forensic examination of a logical drive image
(the original drive was never forensically
imaged and had been accessed after the
incident) were conducted by an independent
group of forensics experts. They concluded
that the testimony provided by the
prosecution's expert witness was in error,
and that their forensic analysis was not
performed in accordance with industry best
practices. The group further concluded that
the machine was infected with adware, and
that it would pop up ads related to search
terms entered and sites visited by the user.
Further, a site visit by Amero to what could
reasonably have been mistaken for a site on
hairstyles was found to have pornographic
material present. Additionally, the close
proximity of the load times for the
pornographic material was consistent with
an automated retrieval (Eckelberry et al.,
2007). In 2007, the appellate court vacated
the conviction based on false facts presented
during the trial and Amero ultimately
pleaded to a single court of disorderly
conduct (Green, 2008).
In United States v. Solon (US v. Solon,
2013), Solon was convicted of possession and
attempted receipt of child pornography in
2008. Solon was initially identified by the
Wyoming Internet Crimes Against Children
(ICAC) taskforce after he used Limewire to
Page 53

JDFSL V9N4

Technical SODDI Defenses: The Trojan Horse Defense Revisited

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
download five movies containing child
pornography. Solon’s computer was seized,
and a forensic analysis confirmed the
presence of the child pornography movies on
his computer. The defendant admitted to
installing Limewire and using it to download
"Grand Theft Auto", but not to
downloading the child pornography. The
defense asserted Solon's computer was
compromised by malware, leading to the
downloads (Associated Press, 2009). A jury
found Solon guilty, and the conviction was
upheld on appeal.
In one of the more audacious illegal
access/system interference cases, David
Goldstein was charged with felony
possession of child pornography following an
attempt to frame two other individuals for
the same offense. Goldstein, a mental health
patient, allegedly posted links to child
pornographic images in online forums using
the names of Timothy Jerman, a Vermont
state representative, and Dr. Stuart Graves,
a mental health professional. Graves was
associated with a facility that Goldstein had
previously been admitted to, and Jerman's
wife worked as a nurse at the same facility.
The "distribution" was reported to the
Internet Crimes Against Children taskforce
by Goldstein. Goldstein never obtained
physical or virtual access to the devices
owned by Jerman or Graves, so there were
no forensic ties to their machines and the
police quickly cleared them and identified
Goldstein, who used his own email to
register fake profiles he used to post the
images (Moats, 2010).

4.

TECHNICAL SODDI
CASES

The more general technical SODDI cases are
similar to illegal access/system interference
cases, but the defendant claims that an
unnamed individual used their Wi-Fi
connection (which is generally unsecured) or
their computer to commit the charged
offenses. The technical SODDI defense has
only been used occasionally in criminal
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cases, but it has been used extensively in
civil litigation related to copyright
infringement and intellectual property theft.

4.1 Illegal Access/System
Interference Cases
Individuals who have their connections
hijacked or their computers used by another
individual for illegal purposes rarely end up
in court, with the confusion generally
resolved prior to indictment. They have,
however, been subject to erroneous and
invasive searches and seizures in several
cases. While many of the cases involve
content-related offenses, the defenses put
forth are based on illegal access.
In United States v. Smith (US v. Smith,
2014), Smith’s laptop was identified as
having downloaded 26 child pornography
movies to his local hard drive using the
peer-to-peer client Frostwire. The defense
presented the case that one of Smith’s
roommates, who also had access to the
laptop,
had
downloaded
the
child
pornography. The jury convicted Smith, but
the district court entered an acquittal based
on insufficient evidence of guilt being
presented. The jury’s conviction was upheld
on appeal, with the appellate court ruling
that the jury was allowed to determine
Smith’s guilt based on their assessment of
the testimony of the roommates.
In other cases, individuals used their
roommate’s computer to commit offenses.
In United States v. Moriarity (US v.
Moriarty, 2005), Moriarity admitted to
using his roommate’s computer to access
child pornography, which he later attempted
to distribute in return for money. In
Commonwealth v. Robertson-Dewar (Com.
v. Robertson-Dewar, 2003), the defendant
admitted to using both his roommate’s
computer and his roommate’s Penn State
account to download child pornography. In
United States v. Holness (US v. Holness,
2013), Holness used his roommate’s
computer to obtain a $500,000 life insurance
policy on his wife, who he was subsequently
© 2014 ADFSL
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convicted of murdering. None of these cases
resulted in any charges against the
computer owners, however, indicating that
investigators and prosecutors were able to
recognize that the owner was not likely the
perpetrator of the criminal acts prior to
indictment.
A confession to being the “mysterious
stranger” in a technical SODDI defense is
not sufficient, however, to assign guilt. In
one of the more unusual technical SODDI
defenses, People v. Lindstrom (People v.
Lindstrom, 2009), Steven Lyle Lindstrom
wrote a letter taking responsibility for
downloading child pornography using his
roommate’s computer. Lindstrom later
admitted his “roommate generally told him
what to write, and he had confessed to
something he did not do. He made the false
confession because his roommate and the
roommate's girlfriend helped defendant [sic]
when he was homeless.” Because of his false
testimony, Lindstrom was convicted of
perjury and the creation of false
documentation.
While an unnamed individual having
direct access to a defendant’s computer is
usually an easy claim to prove or disprove,
technical SODDI defenses based on the use
of wireless networks are generally more
fungible. The widespread use of Wi-Fi has
increased the number of technical SODDI
issues that have arisen, primarily due to
open wireless access points. In United States
v. Heiland (US v. Heiland, 2014), the
government obtained a warrant to search
the home of Heiland’s neighbors after
tracing child pornography downloads to an
IP address associated with their home. After
executing the warrant and finding no child
pornography in their forensic examination,
the investigators found that the home had
an open wireless access point that had been
setup by Heiland. Several thousand child
pornography images and videos were found
in a subsequent search of Heiland’s
computer, and he is currently awaiting trial
(Pulkkinen, 2014).
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Similarly, in United States v. Stanley
(US v. Stanley, 2014), Stanley was identified
when
police
used
a
tool
called
MoocherHunter to track a connection from
his computer to his neighbor’s Wi-Fi.
Stanley’s neighbors were targeted when
their IP address was associated with
distributing child pornography. Following a
forensic review of their computers, police
identified no child pornography but did find
that they had an unsecured Wi-Fi
connection. Police tracked a connection to
their access point to Stanley’s home and
obtained a warrant to search his computer.
Stanley was convicted for child pornography
offenses, but challenged the use of
MoocherHunter in an appellate court. The
conviction was upheld, with the appellate
court determining that Stanley had “opened
his window and extended an invisible,
virtual arm across the street to the
Neighbor’s router so that he could exploit
his Internet connection”(Lord, 2014).
In United States v. Luchetti (US v.
Luchetti, 2013), federal agents executed a
search warrant on the home of the
Luchetti’s neighbors for downloading child
pornography. Similar to United States v.
Stanley above, the neighbor’s computers
were determined to have no child
pornography present, and the agents found
Luchetti piggybacking on their Wi-Fi
connection. After the execution of a second
warrant that found child pornography on
his machines, Luchetti plead guilty to
receipt of child pornography (Thompson,
2011).
In another case, a home was raided by a
local SWAT team in Evansville, Illinois
when the owner’s open Wi-Fi router was
used to make anonymous Internet threats.
In June 2012, a series of online threats
against the local police were posted to a
Topix forum from the home of Louise
Milan. The police obtained a search warrant
for the IP address associated with the
account, and following a dynamic entry by
the SWAT team were unable to link the
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posting to the homeowner. A more thorough
investigation of her unsecured Wi-Fi led the
police to a neighbor, Derrick Murray, who
was subsequently arrested for posting the
threats. One of the detectives associated
with the case noted that he had identified
the unsecured access point as part of his
surveillance of the home prior to the
warrant execution, but the department
failed to appropriately incorporate this
information in planning their approach
(Anderson, 2012; Wilson, 2014).
Not all misattribution is meant to
conceal activity. In United States v. Ardolf
(US v. Ardolf, 2012), Ardolf was upset with
his neighbors when they filed a police
complaint against him after he kissed their
four-year-old on the lips. In this case, his
neighbor’s Wi-Fi network was secured by
WEP, an easy-to-crack form of wireless
security that has been largely eclipsed by
the more secure WPA and WPA2. Ardolf
used a WEP cracker and hijacked their WiFi connection, creating a fake MySpace
page, downloading child pornography, and
sending threats to Vice President Joe Biden,
all masquerading as his neighbors. After his
neighbors installed a wireless sniffer and
engaged the FBI, Ardolf was identified and
arrested and convicted of identity theft,
making threats against the Vice President,
and receipt and distribution of child
pornography (Hughes, 2011).
The above cases are a representative
sample of the issues illustrating the
difference between identifying an originating
IP address and/or an originating device and
the human committing the offense–
numerous similar examples exist. For most
residential connections, IP addresses are
dynamically assigned to the consumer’s
wireless access point. Through network
address translation (NAT), multiple devices
may share the same externally facing IP
address. Additionally, even though most
providers have recently started providing
access points with encryption already
enabled, they frequently use default
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passwords or enable lesser encryption
options such as WEP. Exploitation of Wi-Fi
has, for criminal purposes, has led to the
search and seizure of computer equipment
belonging to innocent parties, and to the
intrusion into their homes, but there were
no acquittals identified where the defendant
used a technical SODDI defense. The
technical SODDI defense has, however, been
widely employed in civil litigation, primarily
related to copyright infringement.

4.2 Copyright Infringement
Cases
Civil litigation related to activities
associated with an IP address largely began
with a provision of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act that allowed copyright
holders to subpoena ISPs to obtain the
names of the individuals responsible for
accounts sharing copyrighted material
(Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 1998).
Starting in 2003, the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA) and the
Motion Picture Association of America
(MPAA), along with several copyright
aggregators, began filing lawsuits against
individuals that held accounts associated
with IP addresses found to be sharing
allegedly infringing material online. By
2007, the RIAA alone had filed an estimated
30,000
lawsuits,
achieving
successful
judgments of up to $9,250 per song shared
(Leeds, 2007). In 2006, however, the courts
began to accept the technical SODDI
defense from those being sued.
In Virgin Records v. Marson (Virgin
Records America Inc et al v. Tammie
Marson, 2006), the Recording Industry
Association of America traced copyrighted
music being shared online to Marson’s IP
address and identified Marson as the
subscriber
through
her
ISP.
After
attempting unsuccessfully to get Marson to
settle for $3,500, they filed suit against her.
Marson claimed that, because she was a
cheerleading teacher, she frequently had
students over to her house and both her
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students and her daughter’s friends had
access to her computer. Additionally,
Marson’s home network was configured with
an open wireless access point. Marson’s
technical SODDI defense was successful due
to an inability by the groups suing her to
identify Marson as the infringer, and the
lawsuit was dropped (Fisher, 2006).
In Capitol Records v. Foster (Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Foster, 2007), the account
“Fflygirl11” was found to have a shared
folder containing copyrighted music that
was made available on a peer-to-peer file
sharing network. Through a subpoena,
Foster was found to be the account holder
associated with the IP address responsible
for the sharing. Foster contended that the
account was not hers, and that other
individuals had access to her Internet
connection. The RIAA sued Foster on the
grounds that she was guilty of “contributory
infringement”. Ultimately, the suit was
dropped when Foster requested summary
judgment and the RIAA was forced to pay
Foster’s attorney’s fees (Jones, 2007).
The RIAA is not the only group that
has had difficulty combating the technical
SODDI defense.
The MPAA and their
constituent studios have had similar
difficulties. In Elf-Man v. Cariveau (ElfMan, LLC v. Cariveau, 2014), the producers
of the movie Elf-Man sued 152 individuals
who owned ISP accounts associated with IP
addresses sharing the movie online. The
court dismissed the lawsuits, finding:
Home
wireless
networks
are
ubiquitous, meaning that a single IP
address can simultaneously support
multiple
computer
devices
throughout the home and, if not
secured, additional devices operated
by neighbors or passersby. Thus, the
risk of false positives is very real.
Similarly, in In Re BitTorrent Adult
Film Copyright Infringement Cases (In Re
BitTorrent
Adult
Film
Copyright
Infringement Cases, 2012), a group of
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defendants was identified by their ISPs as
owning the IP addresses that had shared
adult films using the BitTorrent peer-topeer software. The group put forth several
technical SODDI defenses:
One movant–John Doe #16–has
stated that he was at work at the
time of the alleged download. John
Doe #2 states under oath that he
closed the subject Earthlink account,
which had been compromised by a
hacker, before the alleged download.
John Doe #29's counsel represents
that his client is an octogenarian
with neither the wherewithal nor the
interest in using BitTorrent to
download Gang Bang Virgins. John
Doe
#10
represents
that
downloading a copy of this film is
contrary to her "religious, moral,
ethical and personal views." Equally
important, she notes that her
wireless router was not secured and
she lives near a municipal parking
lot, thus providing access to
countless neighbors and passersby.
The court found the various defenses
compelling, and further found that the film
studios were improperly avoiding court fees
by aggregating offenders. Aside from John
Doe #1, the actions against the other
defendants were dismissed, with the court
partially concluding:
It is no more likely that the
subscriber to an IP address carried
out a particular computer function–
here
the
purported
illegal
downloading of a single pornographic
film–than to say an individual who
pays the telephone bill made a
specific telephone call... Indeed, due
to the increasingly popularity of
wireless routers, it much less likely...
Unless the wireless router has been
appropriately secured (and in some
cases, even if it has been secured),
neighbors or passersby could access
the Internet using the IP address
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assigned to a particular subscriber
and download the plaintiff's film.

5.

DISCUSSION

The technical SODDI defense has moved
beyond the basic Trojan horse defense and
has been used primarily in child
pornography cases in the criminal courts
and in copyright cases in the civil courts.
The traditional Trojan horse defense has
been used, albeit infrequently, when
contraband is found on a machine and the
defendant claims no knowledge of the
material but cannot otherwise attribute the
material to another person. A more general
technical SODDI defense has been used
more frequently when activity is associated
with an IP address, or when there is a
shared computer without separate accounts
for each user.
Since 2004, this study was unable to
identify any published cases in the United
States where the technical SODDI defense
resulted in an acquittal (the closest was in
Fiola, where the charges were dropped).
Additionally, there have been no court cases
that have had forensics definitively show
that malware placed child pornography on a
subject's computer (the Amero case was
adult pornography pop-ups). A review of
the forensics reports available for many of
the above cases mistake correlation with
causation–the argument is essentially:
1) Malware is present on the device and,
2) It is theoretically possible for someone
to write malware that causes child
pornography to be present on the
machine and,
3) Child pornography is present on the
machine,
Therefore,
4) The child pornography is due to the
malware.
In addition to the errors in logic present
in this argument, it also represents an
incomplete forensic analysis. To show
causation to the point of a valid legal
defense would require that either (a) the
Page 58

malware is activated and monitored to show
that its behavior is consistent with the
alleged activity or (b) reverse engineering
the malware shows that it has the capability
of performing the alleged actions. In the
case of a Trojan horse that allows
unfettered remote access, the defense would
need to show that the infection was present
and active at the time of the alleged activity
and that the activity was inconsistent with
other activity by the defendant (Kardasz,
2009).
The forensic analysis presented in
several of the cases that resulted in reduced
or dropped charges was similar and
contained the logical errors noted by
Kardasz above. In Bandy, Solon, and Fiola,
the same defense technical expert, Tami
Loehrs, provided the analysis that supported
the Trojan horse defense. Loehrs was cited
in Solon by the court for being "outrageous
in her charges" related to a bill for over
$10,000 for three days of services, further
claiming that court had "never heard a
more abrasive witness than that." The court
then advised defense counsel not to use
"this woman with pretty exalted ideas of
her worth." Further, when the witness
testified that that she had to stop her exam
at the analysis of virus logs, the court
provided the jury instruction:
Members of the jury, the witness
just said that she was stopped and
coupled
with
her
testimony
yesterday there is the implication
that the court stopped her from
working. That is absolutely untrue.
It is a falsity, and you are instructed
to ignore it. And we will hear no
more such testimony. I never did
stop this witness from working. I did
stop her from submitting excessive
bills to the United States, and that's
all I ever did (US v. Solon, 2013).
Further,
Loehr's
objectivity
was
questioned
related
to
an
anti-law
enforcement bias in United States v. Elmer
Guy Smith, where she engaged in a
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Facebook conversation with David Loehrs,
writing:

to find its proper target (Anderson,
2012).

FBI: "our mission is to protect you
from the most dangerous threats
facing our nation"

The approach noted above should be
considered in all cases where criminal
activity has been traced to an IP address
without corroborating information that ties
the activity to a specific person.

FBI: the most dangerous threat
facing our nation
David Loehrs replied "F** those guys.
I'll pee on them."(US v. Smith, 2011)
In Amero, the case was brought forward
based in part on poor forensics by the
prosecution. The need for a thorough
forensic analysis was highlighted when a
proper forensic review showed basic flaws in
the initial analysis, which was performed by
a non-expert practitioner using a less-thanrobust digital forensics tool. While the case
resulted in a conviction that was overturned
and an eventual plea agreement, there was
sufficient doubt raised in the expert forensic
analysis to have made a second prosecution
unlikely to be successful.
For the general technical SODDI defense
cases, multiple cases resulted in the wrong
home being searched due to an unsecured or
a compromised wireless access point. None
of these resulted in court cases against the
victims, and forensics was able to clear the
individuals quickly. There was, however, a
major disruption to many innocent
individuals–ranging from knock-and-talks to
a full SWAT response. Because of the
frequency with which Wi-Fi cases have been
found to be due to neighbors, law
enforcement is taking a better approach to
warrants, for example:
On April 30, two FBI special agents
drove past the Carmel home and
noted the existence of two WiFi
networks reachable
from
the
property.
One
used
WEP
encryption, the other had the more
robust WPA2, but the key point
from the FBI’s perspective was that
neither network was unsecured. A
search thus seemed much more likely

© 2014 ADFSL

In contrast with criminal cases, civil
litigation involving the technical SODDI
defense has been extremely successful in
recent case law. The mass lawsuits sent out
by the MPAA and the RIAA have
essentially been halted due to their inability
to tie an IP address to a particular infringer.
Part of this limitation is the inability to
seize and perform forensics on devices
belonging to defendants, which results in the
counterintuitive situation of the defense
being more successful in civil cases, where
the burden of proof is lower, than in
criminal cases (preponderance of the
evidence v. reasonable doubt).

6.

CONCLUSION

Despite a proliferation of botnets that use
hijacked computers to launch computer
attacks and hackers who attack systems
after multiple hops through compromised
machines, there have been no published
cases in the United States where the
technical SODDI defense has resulted in an
acquittal, and the defense itself is rarely put
forth in criminal matters outside of child
pornography cases.
The Trojan horse defense has been
subsumed into the broader technical SODDI
defense. What originated as “the malware
did it” has now morphed into a mosaic of
“either the malware did it or someone else
with access to my computer/network did it.”
More thorough forensics prior to charging is
now becoming the norm, going beyond
simply showing that the subject was at the
keyboard at the time of the activity in
question. In content-related and illegal
access/system interference cases, a review
and through analysis of seized devices for
malware is needed to head off faulty forensic
Page 59

JDFSL V9N4

Technical SODDI Defenses: The Trojan Horse Defense Revisited

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
claims made to the media or in pretrial
negotiations. Similarly, prior to obtaining a
search warrant for any cases involving
network activity, a review of the network
capabilities, specifically Wi-Fi, of the target
location should be performed.

Eckelberry, A., Dardick, G., Folkerts, J. A.,
Shipp, A., Sites, E., Stewart, J., &
Stuart, R. (2007). Technical review of
the trial testimony State of Connecticut
vs. Julie Amero. Retrieved from
http://dfir.com.br/.

Unlike criminal cases, the technical
SODDI defense has been used successfully
and has largely defeated copyright
infringement claims in civil litigation. It is
unlikely that mass copyright infringement
cases targeting individuals sharing movies or
music in a non-commercial manner will
continue to the extent previously seen. Even
if civil imaging of computing devices were
permitted, it would not likely be cost
effective to pursue these actions for
individual infringement actions.

Elf-Man, LLC v. Cariveau, No. C130507RSL (Dist. Court, WD Wash.
2014).
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